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ABSTRACT 
 
Risks management studies in the agri-food sector predominately focus on the technical 
methods and the capability to perceive, prevent, mitigate, and recover from diverse risks. In 
most economic publications the risks are usually studied as other commodity regulated by the 
market supply and demand, and the farmers “willingness to pay” for an insurance contract 
modeled. At the same time, the risk management analysis largely ignore a significant “human 
nature” based (bounded rationality, opportunism) risk, critical factors for the managerial 
choice such as the institutional environment and the transaction costs, and diversity of 
alternative (market, private, collective, public, hybrid) modes of risk management.  
This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional Economics and presents 
a comprehensive framework for analyzing the risk management in the agri-food sector. First, 
it specifies the diverse (natural, technical, behavioral, economic, policy etc.) type of agri-
food risks, and the (market, private, public and hybrid) modes of their management. Second, 
it defines the efficiency of risk management and identifies (personal, institutional, 
dimensional, technological, natural) factors of governance choice. Third, it presents stages in 
the analysis of risk management and for the improvement of public intervention in the risk 
governance. Forth, it identifies the contemporary opportunities and challenges for the risk 
governance in the agri-food chain. Finally, it identifies, and assesses the efficiency and 
prospects of major modes for risk governance in the Bulgarian dairy sector. 
 
Keywords: agri-food chain and risk management; market, private, and public governance; 
dairy risk management, Bulgaria 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Around the globe the issues of management of diverse (natural, technical, market, 
financial, criminal, policy etc.) risks in agrarian and food sectors are among the most topical 
in academic, business and policies debates [Babcock; CIPS; Deep and Dani; EU; OECD; 
Olsson and Skjöldebrand; Ramaswami; RPDRM; Schaffnit-Chatterjee; Shepherd et al.; 
Trench et al.; Weaver and Kim]. In the last decades, newly evolving uncertainty, risks and 
crisis associated with the progression of natural environment, products and technology 
safety, social demands, policies, economy, and globalization, all they have put additional 
challenges on existing system of risk management in agri-food sector.  
Most risks management studies in agri-food sector predominately focus on technical 
methods and capability to perceive, prevent, mitigate, and recover from diverse threats and 
risks [Barker; DTRA & IIBR; Hefnawy; Jaffee et al.; Luning et al.]. In majority of economic 
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publications a Neoclassical approach is applied, the risks is studied as other commodity 
regulated by market supply and demand, and farmers “willingness to pay” for an insurance 
contract in relations to agents risk aversion, risk probability and magnitude of damages 
modeled [Gerasymenko and Zhemoyda; OECD]. Nevertheless, market and private failures 
are acknowledged, and the needs for public intervention in risk management increasingly 
recognized. At the same time, risk management analyses largely ignore a significant “human 
nature” (bounded rationality, opportunism) based risks, the critical factors for the managerial 
choice such as the institutional environment and the transaction costs, and the diversity of 
alternative (market, private, collective, public, hybrid) modes of risk management. As a 
result, the efficiency and complementarities of diverse agri-food risk management modes can 
not be properly assessed [Bachev, 2012a]. 
Despite the significant advancement in the risk management technologies and the 
“menu” of risk reduction, mitigation and copping strategies, a great number of failures and 
challenges (production, supply chain, food and human safety, environmental etc.) continue to 
persist in agri-food sector [Dani and Deep; EU;  Humphrey and Memedovic; OECD; Luning 
et al.]. Consequently, a greater attention is directed to the system of governance which 
eventually determines the exploration of technological opportunities and the state of agri-
food security [Bachev, 2010a, 2011c].  
This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional Economics [Coase, 
1939, 1960; Furuboth and Richter; North; Williamson, 1981, 1996] and presents a 
comprehensive framework for analyzing the risk management in agri-food sector.   
First, it specifies the type of agri-food risks and the modes of their management.  
Second, it defines the efficiency of risk management and identifies factors for the 
governance choice.  
Third, it presents stages in the analysis of risk management and for the improvement of 
public intervention in the risk governance.  
Forth, it specifies the contemporary opportunities and challenges for the risk 
governance in the agri-food chain.  
Finally, it identifies, and assesses the efficiency and prospects of major modes for risk 
governance in the Bulgarian dairy sector. 
The ultimate goal of this paper is to improve the analysis of risk management in agri-
food sector, and to assist public policies and risk management strategies and collective 
actions of individual agents. 
 
2. Framework for analyzing and improvement of risk management 
 
Agri-food risks and modes of risk governance 
 
Risk related to agri-food sector is any current or future hazard (event) with a 
significant negative impact(s). It is either an idiosyncratic, accidental, low probability, 
unpredictable event/threat, or it is systematic - a high probability, “predictable” event/threat.  
The risk and threat could be of a natural origin - e.g. adverse weather, insect attract, 
catastrophic event etc. They may be of a technological origin - “pure” technical failures like 
tractor’s flat tire, engine disorder etc. They are often of human origin - individual or 
collective actions/inactions, “human nature”. Frequently, risks are a combination of previous 
three.  
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A great portion of risks in agri-food sector are caused or are consequences of a human 
actions or inactions. The individual behavior and actions causing risks may range from:  
- agent’s ignorance – “normal” human errors, lack of sufficient knowledge, 
information, and training;  
- risk-taking (retention) strategy of individuals - accepting “higher than normal” risk; 
- mismanagement - bad planning, prevention, recovery;  
- deliberate opportunistic behavior - pre-contractual cheating and “adverse selection”, 
post-contractual “moral hazard”;  
- criminal acts  such as stealing property or yields, arson, invasion on individual safety;  
- terrorist attacks – e.g. contamination of inputs and outputs aiming “mass terror” etc.  
The collective actions which are source of risks are commonly related to:  
- economic dynamics and uncertainty - changing industry and consumers demands, 
market price volatility, international competition, market “failures” and disbalances 
such as “lack“ of labor, credit, certain inputs etc.;  
- collective orders - “free riding” in big organizations, codes of behaviors, industry 
standards, strikes and trade restrictions, community rules and restrictions;  
- public order - political instability and uncertainty, evolution in informal and forma 
social norms and standards, public “failures” such as bad, delayed, under/over 
intervention, law and contracts enforcements, mismanagement, “inefficiency by 
design”, etc.  
The agri-food sector risk could be faced by an agri-food sector component - e.g. risk on 
a dairy-farm, on a food processor, on a trader. The risk could also be caused by the agri-food 
sector - risk from farming, from food processing, from food-distribution etc.   
The risk could be internal for the agri-food chain such as hazards cased by one element 
to another, and staying in or mitigating within the sector. It could also be external associated 
with hazard coming from outside factors (such as natural environment, government policy, 
international trade), and/or affecting external components (consumers, residents, industries, 
nature).  
Finally, the risks could be private, when it is taken by individuals, collectives, 
economic entities (households, firms, cooperatives), industries. The risk is often public 
affecting large groups, communities, consumers, society, future generations.  
The risk is big when there is great likelihood of a risky event to occur and that is 
combined with substantial possible negative consequences. The later may take a great variety 
of forms – e.g. damaged human and livestock health and property, inferior yields and 
income, lost market positions, food and environmental contamination etc. 
When risk is considerable it would likely be associated with significant costs which 
sometimes are hardly expressed in monetary terms - e.g. human health hazards, degradared 
soils, lost biodiversity and eco-system services etc. Thus the “rational” agents maximizing 
own welfare will be interested to invest in risk prevention and reduction. 
In a narrow (“technical”) sense the risk management comprises the individual, 
collective and public action(s) for reducing or eliminating risk and its negative consequences. 
In a broader sense the risk management is the specific system of social order (governance) 
responsible for a particular behavior(s) of agents and determining the way(s) of assignment, 
protection, exchange, coordination, stimulation and disputing diverse risks, rights, resources, 
and activities [Bachev, 2011c]. In the particular socio-economic, technological and natural 
environment, the specific system of risk governance “put in place” is intimately responsible 
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for the efficiency of detection, prevention, mitigation, and reduction of diverse threats and 
risks and their negative consequences [Bachev, 2012a].  
The generic forms and mechanisms of risk governance are (Figure1):  
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Generic risks, factors, stages and modes of risk governance in agri-food sector 
- private modes (“private and collective order”) - diverse private initiatives, and 
specially designed contractual and organizational arrangements tailored to particular features 
of risks and agents – e.g. private or collective codes of behavior, diverse (rational, security, 
future etc.) private contracts, cooperatives, associations, business ventures etc. 
- market modes (“invisible hand of market”) - various decentralized initiatives governed 
by the free market price movements and the market competition such as risk trading (selling 
and buying insurance), future contracts and options, production and trade of special (organic, 
fair-trade, origins) products etc.  
- public modes (“public order”) - various forms of a third-party public (Government, 
international) intervention in market and private sectors such as public information, public 
regulation, public ban, public assistance, public funding, public assurance, public taxation, 
public contract, pubic provision etc.  
Sometimes, the risk management in agri-food sector could be effectively done though 
“self-management” – e.g. production management, adaptation to industry and formal 
standards, “self-insurance” though keeping stocks, financial reserves etc. For instance, 
primitive forms of on farm risk management through improving production management are 
widespread such as control and security enhancement, application of appropriate (pest, 
disease, weather resist) varieties, technology and production structure, product 
diversification, dislocation etc. Similarly, off-farm enterprise (and income) diversification is a 
major strategy for risk management in most of the European farms [Bachev and Tanic]. 
However, very often, the risk management requires an effective governance of relations 
with other agents – exchange and regulations of rights, alignment of conflicts, coalition of 
resources, collective or public actions at regional, national and transnational scales etc. 
Accordingly, a risk could be “managed” through a market mode (e.g. purchase of insurance, 
hedging with future price contingency contracts), a private mode (contractual or literal 
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integration, cooperation), a public form (state regulation, guarantee, compensation), or a 
hybrid combination of other forms.   
 
Efficiency of risk management 
 
The individual modes of risk governance are with unequal efficiency since they have 
dissimilar potential to reduce the likelihood and the (negative) impact of risk, and command 
different costs [Bachev, 2010a].  
Principally, the market or the collective governance has bigger advantages over the 
internal mode (“own protection”) since they allow the exploration of economies of scale and 
scope in risk prevention and bearing (sharing) negative consequences2. However, the risk 
trading and/or sharing is often associated with significant transaction costs - for finding best 
partners, prices, formulating and disputing terms of exchange, coalition, safeguarding against 
new risk from opportunistic behavior of counterparts or partners etc. Consequently, market 
and private sector “fail” to govern effectively the existing and likely risks in agri-food 
sector, and there is a need for a “state intervention” in risk management - assisting farmers 
cooperation, public costs-sharing or provision, mandatory insurance regulation etc.  
Thus “governance matters” and applying a proper structure of risk management is an 
important part of the overall process of the optimization (effective allocation) of resources.  
Following Coase’s logic [Coase, 1960] if property rights were well-defined and 
transaction costs were zero then all risks would be managed in the most efficient (socially 
optimal) way independent of the specific mode of governance3. Then individual agents would 
either sell out their risk to a specialized market agent, or safeguard against the risk through 
terms of a private contract, or join a risk-sharing organization of interested parties. The risk-
taking would be distributed between (exchanged, shared by) agents according to their will 
while the total costs for risk prevention, assurance, reduction, and recovery minimized. The 
rational choice for an individual agent would be to get rid of a significant risk altogether – to 
sell the risk out to a specialized market agent (a risk-taker). Such totally decentralized 
(market) governance would optimize the risk-taking and minimize the “technological costs” 
for risk assurance and recovery exploring the entire potential for economies of size and scope 
at national and/or transnational scales.  
However, when property rights are not well-defined or enforced and transaction costs4 
are high then the type of governance is essential for the extent and costs of risk protection 
[Bachev, 2012a]. For instance, an internal (ownership) mode is often preferred because of the 
comparative protective and costs advantages for “standard” natural or behavioral risk 
management over the outside (market or contract) modes. What is more, frequently the 
enormous transaction costs could even block the development of insurance market or the 
emergence of mutually beneficial (collective) risk-sharing organization. It is well known that 
                                                
2 Most studies on risk management in agriculture focus on modeling farmers “willingness to pay” for 
a risk contract in relations to risk’s probability and amount of likely damages [e.g. Gerasymenko and 
Zhemoyda]. 
3 In such a world some kind of risks would not even exist or be of no importance - e.g. risks related to 
adverse human behavior (any opportunistic intention would be discovered at no costs and interests 
effectively safeguarded). 
4 Transaction costs are the costs associated with the distribution, protection and the exchange of 
diverse rights and obligations of individual, groups, and generations [Bachev, 2010a].  
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despite “common” interests and the huge potential for risk minimization the collective 
organization for risk-sharing are not or hardly developed by stallholders. 
Furthermore, the formal and informal institutional restrictions could make some modes 
of risk governance impossible - e.g. risk assuring monopolies and/or cartel arrangements are 
illegal in many countries while most entrepreneurial risk-taking is endorsed (the “low risk - 
low profit” principle). Thus, not all modes of risk governance are constantly feasible in any 
socio-economic settings5.  
What is more, individual agents differ significantly in their capacity to recognize, take, 
pay for prevention, and manage a risk. For instance, a risk-taking farmer prefers risky but 
more productive forms (e.g. bank credit for a new profitable venture); the bigger enterprise 
can better perceive (hire expertise, collect information) and invest in protection of risks 
and/or take (absorb negative consequences) of a larger risk, etc. Besides, the individual 
agents have quite different interests for an effective management of a particular risk(s) since 
they get unlike benefits and costs from the risk management – e.g. effective environmental 
management often create costs for farmers while benefit the residents and other industries..   
Last but not least important, there is no singe universal form for the management of 
divers type of risks and according to the specific feature of each risk (origin, probability, 
likely damages) there will be different most effective form of governance. For instance, 
while a low probable “standard” (natural, criminal) risk could be effectively governed by a 
classical market contract (e.g. purchase of insurance), most behavioral risks require special 
private modes (branding, long-term or interlink contracts, vertical integration), a high 
damaging risk from a terrorist attract necessities specialized public forms (intelligence, 
security enforcement) etc. 
Hence, depending on the kind and severity of risk, and the interests and personal 
characteristics of individuals, and the specific natural, economic and institutional 
environment, there will be different (most) efficient forms of governing a particular kind of 
risk. Consequently, some governance mix will always exist to deal with divers risks 
associated with the agri-food sector [Bachev and Nanseki]. 
In many cases, an effective risk management leads to a considerable reduction or 
removal of a particular type of risk. However, often complete risk elimination is either very 
costly (“unaffordable” by individuals, communities, society) or practically impossible (when 
uncertainty associated with the future events is enormous, the transaction costs are very high 
etc.). For instance, certain natural risk will always exist despite the available system of risk 
management. Besides, it is practically impossible to write a “compete” contract (e.g. for 
insurance supply and trading risk) including all probable future contingencies, and the 
subsequent rights and obligations of each party. Consequently, some transacting risk will 
always retain. Therefore, an effective risk management is usually connected with the needs 
for some trade-off between the benefits from reducing a particular risk (saved costs, 
minimized negative impacts) and the related costs for the risk governance6.  
Furthermore, an individual mode of governance could offer an effective protection 
from different (multiple) risks. Besides, an effective management of one type of risk might be 
associated with exposure to a new type of risk/costs – e.g. the vertical integration eliminates 
                                                
5 Nevertheless, if costs associated with the illegitimate forms is not high (possibility for disclosure 
low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) while benefits are considerable, then the more 
effective governance prevail – large gray or black economies are widespread around the globe. 
6 Thus some “uncovered” risk would normally remain. 
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the “market risk” but creates a risk from opportunisms of partners. Moreover, the level of the 
(overall) risk exposure is typically determined by the “critical” (most important) riskand the 
integral risk is rarely a sum of the individual risks. For instance, if there is a very high 
risk/threat for stealing the harvest, otherwise important risk for crop pest protection would 
not be added to the overall risk of the farm7.  
Frequently, there are a number of possible (alternative) forms of governance of a 
particular type of risk – e.g. “risk to the environment” could be managed as voluntary actions 
of individual farmers, environmental cooperation, private contracts with interested parties, 
assisted by a third party organization, public eco-contact, public regulation, hybrid forms etc. 
[Bachev, 2010a].  
In certain cases, some forms of the risk management are practically impossible or 
socially unacceptable – e.g. insurance markets do not develop for many kind of agro-food 
risks and the private management is the only option; the management of many environmental 
risks and challenges require collective actions at local, eco-system, regional or transnational 
levels etc. In modern societies many type of risks management are publicly imposed – e.g. 
food safety risk is under public management and harmonized in the EU, there are strict 
regulations on GMC, “precaution principle” is mandatory for the environmental related 
projects and carried out by the state authority, “safety nets” are organized as public projects 
etc. 
Therefore, a comparative analysis is to be employed to select among (technically, 
economically, socially) feasible alternatives the most efficient one – that which would reduce 
the overall risk to “acceptable” level, and which would require minimum total (risk 
assurance and risk governance) costs [Bachev, 2012a]. The later must include all current and 
future costs associated with the risk management – the current technological and 
management costs (for adaptation, compliance, information, certification), risk insurance 
premium, contracting and coalition costs as well as the (current and future) long-term costs 
for adaptation and recovering damages including associated transaction costs (disputes, 
expertise, low suits etc.) for claiming experienced losses8.  
In any case an individual, group, community, sectoral, chain, national and 
international efficiency of the risk management have to be distinguished. It is often when 
elimination of a risk for one agent induce a (new) risk for another agent – e.g. the agri-food 
price fluctuation causes an income risk to the producers but benefits the speculators; the 
application of chemicals reduces risk for the farmers but produces significant negative effects 
(e.g. water, soil and air contamination) on the residents, consumers, affected industries etc.  
Furthermore, the risk management is only a part of the overall governance of divers 
(production, consumption, and transaction) activities of agents9. That is why the total 
                                                
7 That was the case in transitional Bulgarian conditions where due to ineffective low and security 
enforcement, the entire sub-sectors of agriculture (vineyards, orchards) has been abandoned by 
smallholders in certain regions of the country because of the extremely high risk/treat of stealing the 
harvest by organized or individual thieves. 
8 Most analyses of the agri-food risk management usually ignore the current and likely long-term 
transaction costs associated with the risk management. 
9 E.g. most of the managerial innovations in farming and agri-food chain have been driven by the 
transaction costs economizing reason [Sporleder].  
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efficiency (benefits, disadvantages, costs saving and risk minimization potential) of the 
various modes for the individual agents and the public at large are to be taken into account10.  
According to the specific natural and socio-economic environment, the personal 
characteristics of individuals, and the social preferences, various structure of risk governance 
could evolve in different sub-sectors, industries, supply chains, and societies. In one extreme, 
the system of risk management would work well and only the “normal“ (e.g. entrepreneurial) 
risk would be left “ungoverned”. In some cases, market (free-market prices, competition) 
would fail to provide adequate risk governance but a variety of effective private modes 
would emerge to fill the gap - special contractual and organizational arrangements, vertical 
integration, cooperation. Often, both market and private governance may fail but an effective 
public involvement (regulation, assistance, support, partnerships) could cure the problem.  
Nevertheless, there are situations when the specific institutional and risk management 
costs structure would lead to failures of market and private modes as well as of the needed 
public (Government, local authority etc.) intervention in risk governance11. Consequently, a 
whole range of risks would be left unmanaged which would have an adverse effect on the 
size and the sustainability of agri-food enterprises, the markets development, the evolution of 
production and consumption, the state of environment, and the social welfare [Bachev, 
2010a].  
Depending on the costs and the efficiency of the specific system of governance put in a 
particular (sub)sector, region, country, supply chain etc. there will be unlike outcome in terms 
of “residual” risks, and dissimilar state and costs of human, food, environmental etc. security 
in different regions and period of time (Figure 1). For instance, when there is inefficient 
public enforcement of food, labor, environmental etc. safety standards (lack of political 
willingness or administrative capability) then enormous “gray” agrarian and food sector 
develops with inferior, hazardous and counterfeit components. 
 
Factors of governance choice 
 
The forms of risk management in agri-food sector would depended on the risk type and 
features, the personal characteristics of agents, the institutional environment, the progress in 
science and technologies, culture, the social education and preferences, the evolution of 
natural environment etc.  (Figure 1).  
The risk features like origin, probability of occurrence, likely damages, scale etc. are 
important factor for the governance choice. For instance, local technical or behavioral risk 
could be effectively managed though a private mode while most of market and 
environmental risks require collective actions at regional, national or transnational level. For 
a high probability and harmful risks the agents will prefer more secure (and more expensive) 
mode – e.g. security investment, purchase of insurance, keeping reserves, taking hostages, 
interlinked organization. Nevertheless due to the lack of economic means many small size 
farmers can not afford related costs and practice no or primitive forms of risk management – 
cash and carry deals, product diversification etc. Here there is a need for a third party 
                                                
10 Frequently minimization of the risk related costs is associated with an increase in production and/or 
transaction costs, and vice versa. Often the risk elimination costs of one agent brings about a higher 
security for another agent in agri-food chain etc. 
11 Principally, when market and private modes fail there is a strong need for a public intervention in 
agriculture [Bachev, 2011b]. 
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(Government, international assistance) intervention though insurance, support, safety net etc. 
schemes to decrease farmers vulnerability. 
The personal and behavioral characteristics of agents (such as specific interests, 
preferences, knowledge, capability, risk-aversion, reputation, trust, “contractual” power, 
opportunisms) are important factor for the choice of management form. For instance, some 
risks are not perceived (unknown) by private and public agents and therefore no risk 
management is put at all; in some cultures, the cooperative is the preferred mode of agrarian 
organization; experienced and trained farmer could design and manage a bigger organization 
(based on hired labor) and more outside (credit, insurance, inputs supply etc.) contracts 
adapted to his specific needs; a risk-taking entrepreneur prefers riskier but more productive 
(specialized, high margin) ventures etc.  
The behavioral factors such as individuals’ bounded rationality and opportunisms have 
been identified as responsible for the transaction costs, and thus for the choice of 
organizational mode [Williamson, 1996]. They are widely studied in the insurance theory as 
a source for cheating by both sides of contract [Derrig].  
The agents do not possess full information about the economic system (risks, price 
ranges and dynamics, trade opportunities, policy development) since collection and 
processing of such information is very expensive or impossible (multiple markets, future 
events, partners intention for cheating etc.). In order to optimize decision-making they have 
to spent on “increasing their imperfect rationality” (on data collection, analysis, forecasting, 
training, consultation) and selecting forms minimizing related risks/costs (internal 
organization, “selling out” risk etc.).  
The agents are also given to opportunism and if there is an opportunity for some of the 
transacting sides to get non-punishably extra benefit/rent from the exchange he will likely to 
take an advantage of that12. A pre-contractual opportunism (“adverse selection”) occurs 
when some of the partners use the “information asymmetry” to negotiate better contract 
terms. A post-contractual opportunism (“moral hazard”) occurs when some counterpart takes 
advantage of impossibility for full observation on his activities (by another partner, a third-
party) or when he takes “legal advantages” of unpredicted changes in exchange conditions 
(costs, prices, formal regulations etc.). The third form of opportunism (“free ride”) occurs in 
development of large organizations where individual benefits are not-proportional to the 
individual efforts (costs) and everyone tend to expect others to invest in organizational 
development and benefit from the new organization in case of a success [Olson].  
It is often costly or impossible to distinguish the opportunistic from the non-
opportunistic behavior because of the bounded rationality - e.g. a farmer finds out that 
purchased seeds are not of high quality only during the harvesting time. Therefore, the agents 
have to protect their rights, investments, and transactions from the hazard (risk) of 
opportunism through: ex-ante efforts to find reliable counterpart and design efficient mode 
for partners credible commitments; and ex-post investments for overcoming (through 
monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) of possible opportunism during the contract 
execution stage [Williamson, 1996].   
In the agri-food sector the opportunism is widespread before signing an insurance 
contract (not disclosing the real information for possible risks) or during the contract 
                                                
12 If there was no opportunism only risks related to the bounded rationality would remain (natural, 
technical) and consequences easily recovered with the cooperation and in a mutual benefit (risk 
sharing) of all parties. 
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execution period (not taking actions for reducing damages when risky event occurs; 
consciously provoking damages in order to get insurance premium etc.). That augments 
considerably the insurance prices and restricts the utilization of insurance contracts by small 
enterprises. On the other hand, insuree often “discover” the pre-contractual opportunism of 
the insurers only after the occurrence of harmful event finding out that not all assurance 
terms (protected risks, extend of coverage of damages, ways of assessing damages, extra 
hidden costs) had been well explained and/or adapted to farmers needs [Bachev, 2010b].  
For many kinds of farm related risks the markets evolve very slowly and/or the 
insurance services are practically inaccessible by the majority of small operators. What is 
more, for many important risks an insurance is not available “for purchase at all” – e.g. the 
risk of lack of market demand for farm products, the fluctuation of prices, possible 
opportunism of the counterparts etc. That is why farmers have to develop other (private, 
collective) modes to safeguard their investments and rights or lobby for a public intervention 
in the assurance supply. 
The institutional environment (“rules of the game”)13 is important factor for the 
management choice. For instance, in many countries some forms of risk governance are 
fundamental rights (on food, labor, environmental security and safety) and guaranteed by the 
state; a public income support to farmers is “institutionalized”; environment and food safety 
standards could differ even between different regions in the same state etc. Furthermore, the 
(external) institutional environment considerably affects the level of transaction costs – e.g. 
in recent years tens of thousands of European farms and processors have been closed due to 
the impossibility to adapt to (invest for) newly introduced EU standards for quality, safety, 
environmental preservation, animal welfare, certification etc.  
Principally, in the conditions of stable and well-working public regulation (regulations, 
quality standards, price guarantees, quotas) and the effective mechanisms for laws and 
contract enforcement, a preference is given to the standard (spotlight and classical) market 
contracts. When rights and rules are not well defined or changing, and the 
absolute/contracted right effectively enforced, that lead to the domination of primitive form 
of risk management (subsistence farming, personalized and over-integrated forms) and the 
high vulnerability to diverse (natural, private, market, contractual, policy etc.) risks. The later 
was the case during the post communist transition in East Europe characterized by the 
fundamental restructuring, the “rules change” and ineffective public enforcement, a high 
exposure to “new” (natural, market, entrepreneurial, private, contractual, institutional, 
international etc.) risks by the newly evolving private structures, unsustainable organizations, 
large gray economies, undeveloped or missing (agrarian credit, insurance, extension supply 
etc.) markets,  individuals (e.g. thefts) and organized (e.g. providers of “security services”) 
risk introduction devastating the private businesses and the household welfare [Bachev, 
2010a].  
The dimensional characteristics of the activity and transactions (the combination of 
uncertainty, frequency, assets specificity, and appropriability)14 are critical for the 
management choice.  
                                                
13 That is formal and informal rights and rules, and the system(s) of their enforcement [North]. They 
are defined by the (formal, informal) laws, tradition, culture, religion, ideological and ethical norms, 
and enforced by the state, convention, community pressure, trust, or self-enforcement. 
14 First three factors are identified by Williamson [1981], and the forth added by Bachev and Labonne. 
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When recurrence of the transactions between the same partners is high, then both sides 
are interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding opportunism, 
sharing risk, building reputation, setting up incentive, adjustment, and conflict resolution 
mechanisms). Here continuation of the relations with a particular partner/s and designing a 
special mode for transacting has a high economic value and the costs for its development 
could be effectively recovered by frequent exchange. When a transaction is occasional 
(incidental) then the possibility for opportunism is great since the cheating side can not be 
easily punished by turning to a competitor (losing future business).  
When uncertainty surrounding transactions increases, then costs for carrying out and 
secure transactions go up (for overcoming information deficiency, safeguarding against risk 
etc.). Since bounded rationality is crucial and opportunism can emerge the agents will use a 
special private form diminishing transaction uncertainty – e.g. trade with origins; providing 
guarantee; using share-rent or output-based compensation; an obligatory collateral for 
providing a credit; participating in inputs-supply or marketing cooperative; complete 
integration.  
The transaction costs get very high when specific assets for the relations with a 
particular partner are to be deployed. Here a costless alternative use of the specific assets is 
not possible (loss of value) if the transactions fail to occur, are prematurely terminated, or 
less favorable terms are renegotiated (in contract renewal time before the end of the life-span 
of the specific capital). Therefore, the dependant investment/assets have to be safeguarded by 
a special form such as a long-term or tied-up contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint 
investment, quasi or complete integration. Often, the later is quite expensive, investment in 
the specific capital not made, and the activity/transactions can not take place or occurs 
without (or loss of) comparative advantages in respect to the productivity [Bachev, 2011b]. 
If a high symmetrical (risk, capacity, product, timing, location etc.) dependency of the 
assets of the counterparts exists (a regime of “bilateral trade”) there are strong incentives in 
the both parties to elaborate a special private mode of governance (e.g. interlinking the credit, 
inputs and insurance supply against the marketing of output). A special relational contract is 
applied when detailed terms of transacting are not known at outset (a high uncertainty), and a 
framework (the mutual expectations) rather than the specification of the obligations of 
counterparts is practiced. Here partners’ (self)restrict from opportunism and are motivated to 
settle emerging difficulties and continue relations (a situation of frequent reciprocial trade). 
When unilateral dependency exists (risk of unwanted “exchange”, quasi or full 
monopoly), then the dependent side has to protect the investments against possible 
opportunism (behavioral uncertainty/certainty) through integrating transactions (unified 
organization, joint ownership, cooperative); or safeguarding them with an interlinked 
contract, exchange of economic hostages, development of collective organization to outstand 
asymmetrical dependency (for price negotiation, lobbying for Government regulations) etc.  
The activity and transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on 
behavior, products, services or resources is low. Because of the bounded rationality, the costs 
for the protection, detection, verification, and a third-party (court) punishment of unwanted 
exchange extremely high. The agents would either over-produce (e.g. negative externalities) 
or under-organize such activity (positive externalities) unless they are governed by an 
efficient private or hybrid mode - cooperation, strategic alliances, a long-term contract, trade 
secrets, or a public order. 
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The progress in science and technologies significantly improves the risk management 
and facilitate the diversification of its form. For instance, the introduction of new (resistant) 
plant and livestock varieties; the mechanization and standardization of operations and 
products; the application of information, forecasting, monitoring, storage, and transportation 
technologies, all they improve significantly the risk management in agri-food chain [COST; 
Hefnawy]. The modern application of the science and technologies is also associated with the 
production and/exposure to the new type of risks – e.g. green-house gas emitions, genetic 
contamination, natural resource depletion, technical over-dependency etc. 
Finally, the natural environment and its evolution are critical factors for the 
management choice. For instance, certain geographical regions (mountainous, river beds, 
tropics, etc.) are more prone then others for natural menace and risks like soil erosion, soil 
and water contamination, frosts, droughts, floods, pest attacks, diseases, wild animal 
invasions etc. What is more, evolution of the natural environment associated with a global 
worming, extreme weather, plant and animal diseases, drought, flooding and other natural 
disasters, is posing series of new challenges for the risk management in the agrarian and food 
sector [Hefnawy; OECD, 2011]. 
The identification of the “critical factors” of the risk management choice, the range of 
practically possible forms, and their efficiency (costs and benefits) for the individual agents, 
stages, subsectors, countries, food chains and public at large, is to be a subject for a special 
micro-economic study. 
The comparative analysis is to be employed to select among the feasible forms the 
most efficient one reducing the overall risk to an “acceptable” level and minimizing the total 
(risk assurance and governance) costs. Most of the elements of the efficiency of the risk 
governance are hardly to quantify – e.g. the individuals’ personal characteristics, the amount 
of the risk, the level of benefits and costs15 associated with each mode etc. That is why a 
qualitative (Discrete structural) analysis16 could be used. The later matches the features of a 
risk to be managed (the probability, significance, acceptance level, needs for collective action 
etc.) and its critical (institutional, technological, behavioral etc.) factors with the 
comparative advantages (the effective potential) of the alternative modes to inform, 
stimulate an appropriate behavior, and align the interests of associated agents, and to 
overcome, reduce, control, share, dispute, and minimize the overall costs of that risk.  
In a specific market, institutional, technological and natural environment the effective 
risk governance choice will depend on the combination of the risk features (probability of 
occurrence, likely magnitude of damages) and the critical dimensions of the 
activity/transactions (appropriability, assets specificity and frequency).  Figure 2 presents a 
matrix with the principle forms for the effective risk governance in agri-food sector.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 The “measurement problems” associated with the transaction benefits and costs are well specified 
[Bachev,   2011b]. They also prevent the utilization of the traditional (Neoclassical) models simply by 
adding a new “transacting”, risk management etc. activity [Furuboth and Richter]. 
16 The operationalisation of the Discrete Structural Analysis of the economic organization is done by 
Williamson [1981]. 
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                             Figure 2. Principle modes for risk governance in agri-food sector 
 
For instance, likely probable and low damaging risks combined with a small assets 
specificity and appropriability usually do not necessitate (motivate, economically justify) any 
risk management.  
A high “standard” risk could be effectively managed through a free market mode such 
as a standard (classical) insurance, inputs supply, marketing etc. contracts.  
Highly probable and damaging risks with a good appropriability and frequency of 
transactions between the same partners require a special (e.g. relational) contract. The later 
form is also appropriate for the risks surrounding with low uncertainty, high assets specificity 
and appropriability, and occasional character of the relations between the counterparts.  
Principally, risks combined with high specificity, appropriability and frequency could 
be effectively managed though a vertical integration (internal risk management, contract 
forward or backward integration for risk sharing or mitigation).  
Highly likely and menacing risks combined with a high assets specificity and a good 
appropriability call for a collective organization (cooperation, collective action). Moreover, 
such risk/costs sharing organization could be easily initiated and maintained since the 
condition of a high risk and assets dependency is in place. 
A serious transacting risk exists when the situation of assets specificity is combined 
with a high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability. The elaboration of a special 
governing structure for private transacting is not justified, the specific (risk reducing) 
investments not made, and the activity/restriction of activity fails to occur at an effective 
scale (“market and contract failure”). Here, a third-part (private, NGO, public) involvement 
in the transactions is necessary (assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make them 
more efficient or possible at all. The unprecedented development of the special origins, 
organic farming, systems of “fair-trade” are good examples in this respect. There is 
increasing consumer’s demand (a price premium) for the organic, original, and fair-trade 
products associated with some forms of (natural, poor household, labor, quality etc.) risk 
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management. Nevertheless the supply of the later products could not be met unless effective 
trilateral governance including an independent certification and control is put in place. 
Similarly, for risks with a low appropriability a third party (public) intervention is 
necessary to secure the effective risk management. Moreover, while a high probability low 
danger risks need a collective organization assisted by a third-party (“quasi” public 
organization for risk sharing and mitigation), the high damaging risks necessitate a public 
organization. 
 
Stages in the analysis and improvement of risk management 
 
The analysis and the improvement of the risk governance in the agri-food chain is to 
include following steps (Figure 3): 
First, identification of existing and emerging threats and risks in agri-food chain. The 
persistence of certain risks is a good indicator for ineffective management [Bachev and 
Nanseki]. The modern science offers quite reliable and sophisticated methods for assessing 
various risks to or caused by the agri-food chain [DTRA & IIBR; Trench et al.].  
              
 
Figure 3. Analysis and improvement of risk management in agri-food sector  
 
Second, specification of existing and other feasible modes of risks governance, and 
assessing their efficiency, sustainability and prospects of development.  
The efficiency of individual modes shows the capability for risks detection, prevention, 
mitigation and recovery at lowest costs while the sustainability reveals the ”internal” 
potential to adapt to socio-economic, technological and environmental changes and 
associated threats and risks. A holistic framework for assessing the efficiency and the 
evolution of governing modes is suggested by OECD [2011] and Bachev [2010a].  
That stage is to identify the deficiencies of dominating (market, private, and public) 
modes to solve the existing and emerging risks, and to determine the needs for a (new) public 
intervention. For instance, when appropriability associated with the transaction/activity is 
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low, there is no pure market or private mode to protect from associated risks17. Emerging of a 
special large-members organization for dealing with low appropriability to cover the entire 
“social” risk would be very slow and expensive, and they unlikely be sustainable in a long 
run (free riding). Therefore, there is a strong need for a third-party public intervention in 
order to make protection of such risk possible or more effective – either pure public 
organization (e.g. public assurance for high damage natural or economic disasters) or “quasi 
public” mode (collective organization assisted/ordered by a third party) for high probable 
lower damaging risks (Figure 2). 
Third, identification of the alternative modes for public intervention to correct (the 
market, private, public) failures, assessing their comparative efficiency, and selection the best 
one(s).  
The comparative assessment is to be made on (technically, economically, politically) 
feasible forms as mode(s) minimizing the total risk management (implementing and 
transaction) costs selected. The analysis is to take into account the overall private and social 
costs – the direct and indirect (individual, third-party, tax payer, assistance agency etc.) 
expenses, and the private and public transacting costs. The later often comprise a significant 
portion of the overall risk management costs and are usually ignored by analysts – e.g. costs 
for the coordination, stimulation, mismanagement of the bureaucracy; for the individuals’ 
participation and usage of the public modes (expenses for information, paper works, 
payments of fees, bribes); the costs for community control over and for the reorganization of 
the bureaucracy (modernization and liquidation of public modes), and the (opportunity) costs 
of public inaction, etc. 
Initially, the existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, risks, failures) in the 
organization of market and private governance have to be specified. The appropriate pubic 
involvement would be to create institutional environment for: making private investments 
less dependent, decreasing uncertainty surrounding market and private transactions, 
increasing intensity of exchange, protecting private rights and investments etc. For instance, 
the State establishes and enforces quality, safety and eco-standards, certifies producers, 
regulates employment relations, transfers management rights on natural resources etc., and 
all that increases the efficiency of market and private risk management.   
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability have to be considered. 
The low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified private rights and 
obligations. In some cases, the most effective government intervention would be to introduce 
and enforce new private and groups (property) rights – on diverse type of risks and its 
trading; on natural and biological resources; on food safety and clean environment; tradable 
quotas for products, inputs, emissions; on intellectual property, origins etc. That intervention 
transfers the organization of activity/transactions into market and private governance, 
liberalizes market competition and induces private incentives (and investments) in certain 
agrarian risk management.  
In other instances, it is more efficient to put in place public regulations for risk 
minimization: for utilization of resources, products and services (e.g. standards for labor, 
product, and environmental safety); introduction of foreign species and GM crops, and for 
                                                
17 Respecting others rights or “granting” risk protection rights to others could be governed by the 
“good will” or charity actions (e.g. eco-sustainability movement initially evolved as a voluntary 
activity). In any case, the voluntary initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire social demand 
especially if they require significant costs. 
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(water, soil, air, comfort) contamination; ban on certain inputs, products or technologies; 
regulations for trading ecosystem service protection; trade regimes; mandatory risk and eco-
training and licensing of operators, etc.  
In other instances, using the incentives and restrictions of the tax system is the most 
effective form for intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences are widely used to create 
favorable conditions for the development of certain (sub)sectors and regions, forms of 
organization, segment of population, or types of activities. For instance, the environmental 
taxation on emissions or products (inputs, outputs of production) is applied to reduce use or 
emissions of harmful substances; tax reductions are used to assist overcoming the negative 
consequences of natural disasters by private agents etc.  
In some cases, public support to private organizations is the best mode for intervention. 
Programs for modernization, enterprise adaptation, income support, environmental 
conservation, public risk-sharing etc. are common in most countries around the world. 
For instance, in the USA farm crop insurance has emerged as the most important farm 
program while insurance payments to farmers are the largest source of farm assistance 
[Zulauf and Orden]. 
Often providing public information, recommendations, and training to farmers, 
entrepreneurs, residence, and consumers in risk management is the most efficient form.  
In some cases, pure public organization (in-house production, public provision) is the 
most effective as in the case of critical infrastructure; food safety inspections; research, 
education and extension; agro-meteorological forecasts; border sanitary and veterinary 
control; recovery from the natural catastrophe etc. 
Usually, the specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of 
public intervention. The necessity of combined intervention (governance mix) is caused by: 
the complementarities (joint effect) of the individual forms; the restricted potential of some 
less expensive forms to achieve a certain (but not the entire) level of the socially preferred 
risk prevention and mitigation; the possibility to get extra benefits (e.g. “cross-compliance” 
requirement for participation in the public programs); the specific critical dimensions of 
governed activity; the risk and uncertainty (little knowledge, experience) associated with 
likely impact of the new forms; the administrative and financial capability of the Government 
to fund, control, and implement different modes; and the dominating policy doctrine. 
The level of effective public intervention (governance) also depends on the kind of risk 
and the scale of intervention. There are public involvements which are to be executed at local 
(ecosystem, community, regional) level, while others require nationwide governance. And 
finally, there are risk management activities, which are to be initiated and coordinated at 
international (regional, European, worldwide) level due to the strong necessity for trans-
border actions or the consistent (national, local) government failures. Very frequently the 
effective governance of many problems and risks requires multilevel governance with a 
system of combined actions at various levels involving diverse range of actors and 
geographical scales. 
The public (regulatory, provision, inspecting) modes must have built mechanisms for 
increasing the competency (decrease the bounded rationality, powerlessness) of the 
bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public at large as well as restricting the 
possible opportunism (cheating, interlinking, abuse of power) of the public officers and 
stakeholders. That could be made by training, introducing new assessment and 
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communication technologies, increasing transparency, and involving experts, beneficiaries, 
and interests groups in the management of public modes at all levels.  
Generally, hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than the 
pure public forms given coordination, incentives, control and cost-sharing advantages. The 
involvement of the farmers, beneficiaries and interest groups increases the efficiency, 
decreases asymmetry of information, restricts opportunisms, increases incentives for private 
co-investment, and reduces management costs. For instance, the enforcement of most labor, 
quality, animal welfare, and environmental standards is often very difficult or impossible at 
all. Stimulating and supporting (assisting, training, funding) the private voluntary actions are 
much more effective then the mandatory public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, 
enforcement, and disputing costs [Bachev, 2010a].   
If there is strong need for a third-party public involvement but the effective 
(government, local authority, international assistance) intervention in risk management is not 
introduced in a due time, then significant risks to individuals and public at large would 
persist while the agrarian “development” substantially deformed.  
Dealing with many problems and risks in the agri-food sector/chain would require 
multiform, hybrid, multilevel, and transnational intervention, and therefore the appropriate 
governance mix is to be specified as a result of the comparative analysis. The later let 
improve the design of the (new) public intervention according to the specific conditions of 
the food-chain components in the particular country or region in terms of increasing security 
and decreasing costs.  
Suggested new approach also let predict likely cases of the (new) public failures due to 
the impossibility to mobilize a political support and resources or ineffective implementation 
of otherwise “good” policies in the particular conditions. Since public failure is feasible, its 
timely detection permits foreseeing the persistence/rising of certain risks, and informing the 
local and international communities about the consequences. 
The risk management analysis is to be made at different levels – the individual 
component (inputs supply, farm, processing, transportation, distribution etc.), regional, sub-
sectors, food-chain, national, and international according to the type of risks and the scales of 
collective actions necessary to mitigate the risks. It is not a one time exercise completing in 
the last stage with a perfect system of risk-management. It is rather a permanent process 
which is to improve the risk-management along with the evolution of socio-economic and 
natural environment, the individual and communities’ awareness, and the modernization of 
technologies. Besides, the public (local, national, international) failure often prevails which 
brings us into the next cycle in the improvement of risk-management in the agri-food sector.  
For the application of the suggested new approach, besides traditional statistical, 
industry etc. data, a new type of data are necessary for the diverse type of risks and the forms 
of governance, their critical factors for each agent, the level of related benefits and costs etc. 
Such data are to be collected though interviews with the agri-food chain managers, 
stakeholders, and experts in the area.  
 
2. Contemporary opportunities and challenges for agri-food risk management  
 
The modern agri-food chains involve millions actors with different interests, multiple 
stages, and divers risks requiring a complex, multilateral and multilevel governance at a large 
scale. For instance, in the EU the number of employed persons in the agri-food chain reaches 
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48 million working in almost 17 million different holdings and enterprises (Table 1) while 
final consumers comprises 500 millions18.  
 
Table 1. Number of enterprises and persons employed in EU agri-food chain (1000) 
 
Food and beverages activities  Agriculture 
Manufacturing Wholesaling Retailing Services 
      
      Number 
 
   2007                                            2008 
EU - 27 13 700.4 267.9 275.1 1 060.2 1 448.4 Holdings and 
enterprises Bulgaria 493.1 5.1 5.4 31.5 19.2 
EU - 27 26 669.4 4 725.0 2 001.5 7 369.7 7 316.5 Regular farm  
labor force and  
persons employed 
Bulgaria 950.0 106.5 44.9 102.0 92.0 
Source: Eurostat, 2011a 
 
Various existing and emerging (natural, technological, health, behavioral etc.) threats 
and risks along with the modern agri-food chains are well-identified [DTRA & IIBR; 
Eurostat,  2011a; Humphrey and Memedovic; OECD).  
Diverse market and private modes have emerged to deal with the specific risks driven 
by the ethics, competition, consumer demand, business initiatives, and trade opportunities – 
e.g. direct marketing, voluntary codes (professional and corporate social, labor, 
environmental etc. responsibility), industry standards, insurance schemes, guarantees, fair-
trade, trade with brands, origins, organic and quality products etc. (Figure 4).  
 
Modes of governance Risks 
market private public 
Natural disasters and 
extreme weather; 
Pests and diseases; 
Improper using 
pesticides and 
chemicals; 
Using contaminated 
water and soils; 
Improper animal health 
practices; 
Poor waste disposal; 
Using prohibited 
antibiotics; 
Using contaminated 
feeds; 
Animal-borne diseases; 
Improper handling and 
storage; 
Poor cooling system; 
Poor sanitation and 
Clientatli-sation;  
Direct marketing; 
Informal 
branding;  
Insurance 
purchase; 
Organic 
production; 
Specific origins; 
Brands; 
Eco-system 
services; 
Special (quality, 
eco-) labeling; 
Outsourcing;  
Security 
services; 
Fair trade system; 
Standards 
insurance 
Improved inputs, technology, variety 
and structure of production; 
Product and income diversification; 
Self-insurance forms; 
Patronage and community insurance; 
Voluntary initiatives; 
Professional codes; 
Building (good) reputation;  
Guarantees; 
Private producers labels and brands;  
Private traders labels and brands;  
Private and collective origins and 
specialties; 
Private products recalls; 
Long-term contracts; 
Interlink contracts (inputs and service 
supply against marketing); 
Inputs and service cooperatives; 
Production cooperation; 
Joint-ventures; 
Mandatory (products, process, labor, animal-welfare, 
environmental) quality and safety standards; 
Regulations/bans for using resources, inputs, technologies; 
Regulations organic farming; 
Quotas for emissions and using products/resources; 
Regulations for introduction foreign species/GMC; 
Regulations for plant and animal nutrition and healthcare; 
Licensing for using agro-systems and natural resources; 
Mandatory farming, safety, eco-training; 
Mandatory certifications and licensing; 
Compulsory food labeling and information; 
Public accreditation and certification; 
Mandatory records keeping and traceability coding; 
Public products recalls; 
Public food, veterinary, sanitary, border control; 
Public price and income support; 
Public preferential crediting; 
Public funding farms and processors adaptation; 
Public safety nets and disaster reliefs; 
Financial support to organic production, traditional and special 
                                                
18 figures get much bigger if we take into account the total number of the global agents involved in 
the EU agri-food chains – farmers, processors, importers etc. from around the world. 
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hygiene; 
Using unhygienic 
containers, processing 
units, and 
transport facilities; 
Improper grading and 
packaging; 
Using prohibited food-
additives; 
Inputs, resources and  
output contamination; 
Chancing social 
demands; 
Market price fluctuation; 
Market failures; 
Political and 
institutional instability; 
Ignorance of agents; 
Opportunistic behavior 
of counterpart, collation 
partner, a third party or 
public officer; 
Criminal intrusion; 
Terrorist attacks 
contract; 
Hedging with 
future price 
contacts 
 
Internal audits; 
NGOs; 
Professional and consumer 
associations; 
Good Agricultural Practice; 
Good Hygienic Practice; 
Good Manufacturing Practice;  
Good Transport Practice; 
Good Trade Practice; 
GLOBALGAP; 
Private and collective food quality 
and safety management systems;  
Certification; 
Licensing; 
Third-party verification; 
Inputs supply integration;  
Integration into processing and 
marketing; 
Franchises; 
Risk pooling and marketing 
cooperatives; 
Vertical integration; 
Consumers cooperatives 
products, private and collective actions; 
National GAPs, cross-compliance requirements; 
Public education, information, advise; 
Designating vulnerable/dangerous zones; 
Tax rebates, exception, breaks; 
Eco-taxation (emissions, products, wastes); 
Public eco-contracts; 
Public food and security research/extension;  
Assistance in farmers, stakeholders, security cooperation; 
Public promotion/partnerships of private initiatives; 
Public food security monitoring, assessments, foresights; 
Public food reserves and buffer stocks; 
Public prevention and recovery measures; 
Public compensation of (private) damages; 
Disposal of (old) chemicals, degradated lands and water 
purification;  
Protected Designation of Origin, Protected Geographical 
Indication, Traditional Specialty Guaranteed; 
European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed; 
EU policies, support and enforcement agencies (EFSA, ECDC, 
ECHA, CFCA, OSHA, EEA); 
International Standardization Organization (ISO 22000); 
UN (FAO, WHO) agencies interventions (Codex Alimentarius; 
Early Warning Systems; Crisis Management Centers); 
Bilateral and multilateral trading agreements/rules (WTO); 
National and international anticrime/antiterrorists bodies 
Figure 4. Major risks and modes of governance along with modern agri-food chain 
 
 
Furthermore, different bilateral and multilateral private forms are widely used to 
safeguard against the risks, explore the benefits, and facilitate the exchange – e.g. 
clientalisation, contractual arrangements, cooperation, complete backward or forward 
integration etc.  
Special trilateral forms have evolved to enhance security and partners and consumers 
confidence including an independent (a third-party) certification and inspection. Trade 
internationalization is increasingly associated with the collective private actions (standards, 
control mechanisms etc.) at a transnational and global scale (e.g. GLOBALGAP). 
The property (security and safety) rights modernization, and the market and private 
“failures” brought about needs and modes for public interventions (assistance, regulations, 
provision) in the agri-food sector. Moreover, the scope and stringency of publicly-imposed 
rules expend constantly embracing new products, methods, dimensions (human, animal, 
plant, eco-health), hazards (GMC, nanotechnology, terrorism), and information requirements.  
Furthermore, the globalization of exchange, and threats and risks increasingly require 
setting up a transnational public order (e.g. ISO, WHO, FAO, WTO etc.). For instance, there 
are common (traceability, precaution, communication) principles, (food, veterinary, 
phytosanitary, feed, environmental etc.) legislation, and implementing and enforcing 
agencies (such as EFSA, ECDC, ECHA) for the agri-food chains in the EU (including for 
imported products).  
Consumers concerns about the food-safety risks significantly have increased after the 
major food-safety “events”/crisis in recent years (e.g. Avian flu; Mad-cow and Foot-and-
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mouth diseases; poultry salmonella; contaminations of dairy, berries, olive-oil; natural and 
industrial disasters impacts etc.). For instance, since 2005 there has been an augmentation of 
the respondents “worrying about food-safety problems” in the EU and it comprise a 
significant share now (Figure 5); as much as 48% of the European consumers (in Bulgaria 
75%) indicate that the consumed food “very or fairly likely” can damage their health etc. 
[Eurobarometer].   
The number of cases and incidence rates of various foodborne and waterborne diseases 
is significant even in developed countries. For example, in the USA yearly 1 in 6 or 48 
million people gets sick, 128,000 are hospitalized, and 3,000 die of foodborne diseases 
[CDC]. In the EU there are also a number of confirm cases of foodborne diseases having a 
high incidence rate, most notably Giardiasis (167,025), Campylobacteriosis (190,579) and 
Salmonellosis (134,606) [ECDC]. 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Figure 5. Indicate if you are worried in relation with following food-safety problems (% of respondents) 
 
There are a number of (new) opportunities for the risk governance in the agri-food 
chain (Figure 6): 
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Figure 6. Opportunities and challenges for risks governance in agri-food chain  
 
First, the advances and the dissemination of the technical food-chain, training and risk-
management methods (such as microbiological, genetic, electrical, laser, robotic, 
immunological, chemical and biosensors, nanotechnology, ICT etc.), the integral and food-
chain approaches, and the research, monitoring, testing, decision, and foresighting capability 
for the risk-detection, assessment, prevention, and mitigation [COST; Trench at al.]. For 
instance, the advancements in detection, assessment and mitigation methods and technologies 
associated with the biological and the chemical risks have been presented at a recent 
international conference [DTRA & IIBR]. 
Second, the modernization and the international harmonization of the institutional 
environment (private, corporate, collective, NGOs, public food-safety and related standards, 
rules, enforcements etc.). For instance, the EU membership improves considerably the “rules 
of the game” in the new member states like Bulgaria; the market access rules, and/or the 
“corporate responsibilities” induce the agri-food sector transformation of exporting countries 
in Africa, Latin America and Asia etc. 
Third, the considerable development of the specialization of activities (including in the 
risk-taking, monitoring, management) and the concentration of (integral) management in the 
food-production, processing, servicing, and distribution - centralized innovation and 
enforcement; time, scale, and scope economies; easy third-party control etc. For instance, the 
market share of the three largest food-retailers comprise between 27-91% in the EU states 
[Eurostat, 2011a]; the food-safety training, certification, inspection, and information are big 
international business [Humphrey and Memedovic] etc. 
Forth, the quasi or complete integration of the food-chain’s consecutive or dependent 
stages creating mutual interests, and the effective and long-term means for the risk-
perception, communication, and management. For example, in Bulgaria the (raw) milk 
supply is closely integrated by the (dairy) processors through on-farm (collecting, testing) 
investments and interlink (inputs, credit, and service supply against milk-delivery) contracts 
System of 
risk 
governance 
 
New opportunities 
- advances in technical methods, 
approaches, capability 
- modernization and harmonization 
of institutional environment 
- specialization of activity and 
concentration of management 
- integration of consecutive and 
dependent stages 
- consumers’ “willingness to pay” 
for food-safety attributes 
- consumers and media 
involvement 
- national and transnational  
cooperation 
New challenges 
- new threats/risks (evolution of 
nature, economies, demands, inputs, 
technologies, products, governance, 
exchange; adversary, terrorist attacks) 
- separation of risk-creation from 
risk-taking (dependencies, 
externalities) 
- mass production, distribution, 
consumption vulnerability 
- high adaptation and compliance 
costs 
- unequal norms, implementing 
capability, policies, private strategies  
- (national/international) public 
failure  
- informal/gray agri-food sector 
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with the stallholders, while the dairy marketing is managed by branding and long-term 
contracts – standards and bio-labels [Bachev, 2011a].  
Fifth, the increasing consumers “willingness to pay” for the food-safety attributes such 
as chemical and hormone bans, safety and inspection labels, original and special products etc. 
[Trench at al.]. The later justify and make economically possible the paying-back of the costs 
for a special governance.  
Six, the growing consumers’ (representation, organizations) and the media involvement, 
and the national and transnational (information, technical, managerial, training, certification 
etc.) cooperation of partners and stakeholders improving agents choice, inducing public and 
private actions, enhancing risk-management communication, efficiency, and speed.  
The modern development is also associated with a number of (new) challenges for the 
risk governance in the agri-food chain: 
i/ the emergence of new threats, risks and uncertainty associated with the evolution of 
natural environment (e.g. climate change, water stress, “new” plant, animal and human 
hazards etc.) as well as the new human induced economic, financial, food, food safety, water, 
environmental etc. crises at large (transnational, global) scales. For instance, in the EU the 
household waste associated with the food (packaging, animal and vegetal wastes) is quite 
significant as merely its animal and vegetal components amounts to 23.8 million tones and 
comprises almost 11% of the all household waste19, or 48 kg per capita [Eurostat, 2011b].  
ii/ the increasing new threats, risks and uncertainty connected with the inputs, 
technologies, and products differentiation and innovation – e.g. Fukushima nuclear accident 
severely affected the agri-food sector in Japan and beyond [Behdani]; there are uncertainties 
and safety concerns associated with the growing application of nanotechnologies and  GMCs  
etc. [Eurostat, 2011a]. 
iii/ the increasing specialization and concentration of activity and organizations which 
separates the “risk-creation” (incident, ignorance, opportunistic behavior) and the risk-
taking (unilateral-dependencies, quasi-monopolies, spill-overs, externalities etc.). That makes 
the risk-assessment, pricing, communication, disputing, and liability through the (pure) 
market and private modes very difficult and costly. For instance, cheating, misleading, and 
pirating are common in the food-chain relations - high information asymmetry, detection, 
disputing, and punishment costs [Bachev, 2010a]. It is indicating that for the risk information 
consumers in the EU trust more to the “health professionals”, “family and friends”, 
“consumers associations”, “scientists” rather than the “food producers” and “supermarkets 
and shops” (Figure 7). 
 
                                                
19 these levels and shares are believed to be underestimates.  
 
 23 
 
Source: Eurobarometer  
Figure 7. In case a serious food-safety risk is found I would trust for risk information to (% of 
respondents) 
 
iv/ the widespread mass production, distribution, and consumption increases the 
vulnerability of the agri-food chain expending the scope and the severity of natural, 
incidental, opportunistic, criminal or terrorist risks. For instance, in the EU there has been a 
progressive number of the official notifications based on the market and non-member 
countries controls, food-poisoning, consumer complaints, company own-checks, border 
screening and rejections approaching 8000 in 2009 [Eurostat, 2011a]. 
v/ the increasing adaptation and compliance costs (capital, training, certification, 
documentation etc.) for the rapidly evolving market and institutional environment which 
delay or prevent the reformation of smaller farms and food-chain enterprises [Trench et al.; 
Bachev, 2010a]. For instance, in Bulgaria the dairy and meat processors adaptation to the EU 
standards have continued 10 years while two-thirds of them ceased to exist before the 
country accession to the EU in 2007 [Bachev, 2011a]. 
vi/ the public and private food quality and safety standards and the efficiency of their 
enforcement differ considerably between the industries, countries, and regions [Humphrey 
and Memedovic]. That is a result of the unequal norms (e.g. GAPs, formal and informal 
rules) and the implementing and enforcing capability, and/or the deliberate policies or the 
private strategies (e.g. multinationals sell the “same” products with unlike quality in different 
countries). The “double/multiple standards” is responsible for the inequality of exchange, and 
the dissimilar threats and risks exposure of individual agri-food systems. 
vii/ the wide spreading “public failures” in the food-chain (risk) management – the 
bad, inefficient, delayed, under or over interventions; gaps, overlaps, infighting and 
contradictions of different agencies and rules; high bureaucratic costs; unsustainable and 
underfunding etc. For instance, the Bulgarian Food Agency and its Risk Assessment Center 
were established with a 5 years delay after joining the EU (in 2011); the EU Acquis 
Communautaire are still not completely implemented in the country (capability deficiency, 
mismanagement, corruption); trust to the EU rather than the national institutions prevails 
[Bachev, 2010a]. There are also numerous instances of the international assistance or 
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governance failures when institutions are “imported” rather than adapted or designed for the 
specific local conditions [Bachev, 2010a]. 
viii/ the production, marketing, and consumption traditions, the high food or 
governance costs, the will and capacity deficiency, all they are responsible for the persistence 
of a large risky informal/gray agri-food sector around the globe without an effective control, 
and substandard, fake, and illegitimate products and activities. For instance, merely one-third 
of the Bulgarian dairy farms comply with the EU milk-standards, only 0.1% possess safe 
manure-pile sites, a half of produced milk is home-consumed, exchanged or directly sold 
[Bachev, 2011a].  
ix/ the multiplying new treats and risks associated with the adversary (e.g. by a 
competitor) and the terrorist attacks, and the emerging governing and exchange forms (e.g. 
street-sells; internet, phone and mail-orders; shopping-trips etc.). All they require specific 
non-traditional risk-management methods and modes such as guards; policing; intelligence; 
multi-organizational and transnational cooperation etc. 
 
3. Assessing risk management in Bulgarian dairy sector  
 
Modes and efficiency of governing risks for dairy farms 
 
Bulgarian dairy sector has been among the most significantly affected by the 
fundamental post-communist transformation after 1989 and the process of EU integration in 
recent year20.  
The major generic type of risks facing by the dairy farms and causing by the dairy 
sector are natural, market, private and societal (Figure 8). 
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20 Bulgaria joints the European Union on 1 January, 2007. 
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Figure 8. Generic types of Risk Faced and Caused by the Bulgarian Dairy Farming 
 
The major natural risks for the dairy farms are: 
- occasional or epidemic livestock, crop and labor diseases; 
- invasion of wild animals (wolfs, bears) on farm livestock; 
- bad meteorological conditions (extreme temperatures, hails, frosts); 
- damages from pest and predators; 
- natural disasters like floods, mudslides, fires, thunders etc. 
Most dairy farms use traditional methods to protect from the natural hazards: small-
sized farm, more sustainable animal and crop varieties, appropriate livestock structure (more 
goats and sheep, few cows), private dogs and guards, production diversification, remoteness 
of plots, keeping “emergency fund” etc. 
During the entire transition now the primitive technologies and agro-techniques have 
been widespread among the majority of farms. Due to the lack of knowledge, possibility 
and/or financial means the application of sustainable varieties, proper livestock care and diet, 
veterinary and extension services, chemical application and irrigation of lands have been 
very insufficient by most holdings [Bachev, 2012b]. For instance, the amount of fertilizers 
and pesticides used in agriculture has declined considerably, and their current per ha 
application is 22% and 31% of the 1989 level21; there is 21 folds decline in the water used in 
agriculture due to the considerable distortion of irrigation facilities and the high water price 
etc.  
All these have contributed to degradation of farmlands and livestock capability having 
a harmful impact on livestock and crop yields, and farmers’ income and welfare. Moreover, 
no adequate healthcare and feeding of animals, and irrigation and crop rotation have been 
introduced to adapt (counterbalance, resist to) the effects and risks of global climate change 
on farms [Bachev, 2012b]. 
During much of the post communist transition the farms had no access to specialized 
insurance products since they were either unavailable or too expensive. Agrarian insurance 
market has been developing in the	 last few years but it is still not wide-used (Figure 9).  
 
                                                
21 Now, N, P and K fertilizers are applied for 37.4%, 3.4% and 1.9% of utilized agricultural lands 
[MAF]. 
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Source:	 interviews with farm managers  
Figure 9. Type of purchased insurance by Bulgarian dairy farms 
 
The larger farms22 have stronger incentives to sell the risk out because they are highly 
specialized and in the case of hazardous event damages are quite significant. Besides, these 
enterprises possess bigger financial means to insure livestock, crops and related assets. In 
some cases, the big farms posses better positions to negotiate more favorable insurance terms 
than the bulk of the farms (big contracting power, economy of scale, available on farm 
experts or outside expertise). 	 
Moreover, “purchase of insurance” is usually explicitly requested by the banks and/or 
public agencies for participating in diverse commercial and public support programs. The big 
commercial farms are the main recipients of such loans and grants and often unwillingly	 pay 
supplementary price (for insurance supply) to obtain the “interlinked” outside funding. In this 
case, related risk is carried by a specialized market supplier (insurance company rather than 
bank or public agency) and debtor-farms are charged with extra costs to assure needed bank 
loan or public support. 
The majority of farms can not afford the purchase of risk insurance because of the high 
(unaffordable) premiums, unfavorable terms of insurance contracts (not-tailored to particular 
conditions of an individual farm), and low satisfaction from the services of commercial 
insurance providers (frequent disputes about the terms of contracts and extent of harms, 
lengthy delays of payment for damages etc.). 
On the other hand, the insurance companies are reluctant to deal with the small farms 
because of the miniature size (high transacting costs, low profit), and the high possibilities 
for pre- and post-contractual opportunism. Consequently, a great part of farming resources 
and activities is not assured (insuring labor is practically absent, most animal, machineries 
                                                
22 The average milk-cows per farm is 3.3, buffalo-cows 7.3, ewes 10 and she-goats 3.1. The holdings 
with 1-2 heads comprise around 80% of all cow farms (and 30% of the livestock) and 64% of the 
buffalos farms (and 11% of the livestock) in the country, while the share of ewes and she-goat 
holdings with up to 9 heads in total farms is accordingly 30% (83% of livestock) and 96% (67% of 
livestock) of all holdings [MAF]. 
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and buildings are uncovered etc.), and a considerable majority of farmers bear the entire risk 
of failures. 
Despite the potential efficiency (non-for-profit organization, members orientation, 
tailoring products to farms needs) the collective modes for farm insurance have not evolved 
in the country. Here the high transaction costs for the initiation and development of a large 
member organization, and the conflicting interests of different farms impedes that process. 
Moreover, an effective public intervention has not been undertaken to assist (initiate, 
support, legislate) farmers in organization of (“quasi-public”, “quasi-private”) mode for 
collective supply of agrarian insurance. Neither badly needed agrarian guarantee and/or 
compensation fund has been launched. Subsequently, a good part of the affected smaller and 
middle-size farms (having little internal capacity to bear yield failures and property damages) 
experience severe looses, and see the scale of their operations (assets, financial means) and 
welfare further decreased. 
In the last years and especially after the country’s EU accession the public veterinary, 
disease, technology etc. control and the emergency assistance to livestock holdings have been 
enhanced - e.g. isolation and distortion of endangered animals, compensation of farms etc. 
These measures aim at protecting against significant industry and/or public risk(s) from 
certain diseases and epidemics – e.g. mad cow disease, foot and mouth disease, avian 
influenza etc. They have been driven by the public concern for potentially huge economic 
losses for farms, related industries, export, and/or human health hazards.  
Furthermore, some farms have got public aid to cover losses (or recover) from the 
recent natural disasters – animal diseases, floods, rainstorms, mudslides, and extreme 
droughts. The later modes have been incidental and affected mostly the larger operators 
having incentives and capability to deal with the complicated (and costly) bureaucratic 
procedures. 
Finally, an effective public system for farmers’ training and advise in important areas 
such as entrepreneurship, environmental and risk management, diversification etc. has not 
been established in the country. 
Subsequently, most farms do not have proper internal and outside (market, collective, 
public) insurance against the natural risks and face constantly hazards and damages. Affected 
smaller and middle-size holdings experiences severe looses, and sees their assets, scale of 
operations, and welfare further decreased. 
 
The market risk in dairy farming is mostly associated with: 
- the high market uncertainty in terms of demand for milk, quality requirements, 
supply of critical inputs; 
- the huge competition and price fluctuation; 
- the (semi)monopoly condition in the inputs supply and marketing; 
- the missing markets situation.  
Unlike the natural risk, the market related risk can not be assured by a purchase of 
insurance. Special governance is to be put is place to safeguard farmers’ investments.  
The emergence and persistence of the vast subsistence and part-time farming has been 
an effective mode to protect the household assets and labor in the conditions of great 
institutional and economic uncertainty [Bachev, 2010a]. During the transition period market 
and contract trade of owned capital was either impossible or very expensive - “missing” 
markets, high uncertainty, information asymmetry, opportunism, little job opportunities and 
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security. There was also great uncertainty associated with the market supply of basic foods in 
terms of costs, stability, quality, origin etc.  
The internal family production was the most effective way of protecting and getting 
return on the available household resources (labor, land, livestock, savings etc.). In some 
instances, a group subsistent or market oriented farming (partnership) between relatives or 
close friends developed to allow continues operation, part-time farming, effective 
concentration of resources, benefiting from the complementarily of partners’ assets and 
skills, and exploration of economies of scale and scope.   
Similarly, the missing market for the critical farm inputs and services was a major 
reason for the development and sustainability of the production cooperatives. The big 
interdependence and complementarities of the assets, and the “not-for-profit” and 
membership orientation, attracted	 many smallholders. Production cooperatives evolved as an 
effective (cheap, stable) form of supplying highly specific to the farms forage, mechanization	 
service, essential inputs, storage, processing etc. 
The larger farms integrate entirely the forage supply exploring the economies of scale 
and scope and safeguarding against the risk associated with the price, quality, time of 
delivery, and behavioral uncertainty of the outside procurement. Our survey demonstrates 
that all commercial farms secure a significant portion of needed forage for the livestock 
though own-production. Likewise, they own (rather than rent) the dairy animals, and all 
critical assets (milking equipment, barns, machineries) are either owned or protected through 
long-lease contracts.  
Furthermore, private form to govern bilateral trade between the farms and the processor 
has been increasingly employed interlinking the supply of critical inputs (forage, cooling 
tanks etc.) with the marketing of output (Figure 10). The later diminishes considerably the 
risk from market inputs supply and marketing of output of dairy farms, and increases the 
incentives for productive investments.  
The significant risks from the market supply of the critical labor and services are 
typically governed through a private mode. In dairy farming most managerial and 
technological knowledge and even “relationships” with the individual animals are highly 
farm-specific and extremely important for the productivity. Therefore, the critical activities 
are secured by family labor and permanent employment (management, everyday care for 
animals).  
The “ineffective” or “missing” market for the general labor is a major source of risk in 
the sector preventing expansion of the farm size beyond the family borders. The limited and 
unreliable supply (mostly from the unqualified gypsy population), the inferior labor 
conditions, the low wages, and the needs for huge farm specific investment (long working 
hours, lack of holidays, specific knowledge on individual animals, land plots etc.) make it a 
problem to find and maintain needed hired labor. Reliance on family labor and friends as 
well as interlinking the labor supply with the “free” housing, land-leasing, food, other 
services, in some cases with property rights, are all common for the larger commercial farms.  
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        Source:	 interviews with farm managers  
Figure 10. Modes of forage supply in Bulgarian livestock farms 
 
A great majority of the dairy farms report facing significant risks in the milk marketing.  
Firstly, the price and quality competition increases all the time (including a cheap 
import of powder and fresh milk for processing, consumers goods). Recent assessment of the 
competitiveness has found that most dairy holdings are with low level of competitiveness 
[Koteva and Bachev]. Furthermore, all commercial farms want to see the milk price 
augmented in order to allow a modern production and capacity for competition.  
Secondly, in some regions the farmers face monopolies experiencing a price-
discrimination, delayed payments, not-fulfillment of contracted terms etc. The individual 
(smaller scale) producers can not store fresh milk and/or transport it to a long distance (low 
market appropriability of rights, high cite and freshness dependency of the dairy farm). At 
the same time the incentives to cooperate between competing producers and neutralize the 
regional monopolies have been low (high transaction costs, opportunism of free-rider type). 
Third, many smaller-scale dairy farms have been entirely ignored by the dominating 
large processors since they are not able to meet the quantity, quality and safety requirements, 
and command high transportation, training, and transaction	 costs. These farms have only 
available a restricted local fresh-milk market with insignificant demand from the minor 
processors, “street market” or direct delivery to individuals. In some milk-producing but 
remote areas the farmers experience complete missing market situation - no consumers and 
processors. 
A main response of dairy farms has been non-market orientation, reducing or ceasing 
out dairy activity. For instance, comparing to 1990, the number of cows decreased by 39%, 
she-buffalos by 59%, and ewes by 73%; only for 2003-2005 the livestock holdings in the 
country diminished by 20% [MAF]. 
The effective private modes have also emerged to deal with the marketing risks. When a 
high capacity, quality, time of delivery, origin dependency with a particular buyer is in place 
then there are strong bilateral incentives for integration. Diverse modes for marketing 
arrangements are increasingly applied - long-term delivery contacts, price guarantees, 
premiums, interlinks etc. There are also few good examples for collective organizations of 
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marketing with effective negotiating and enforcing relationships with the downstream 
partners.  
A prospective mode for the protection of highly specialized and specific investments is 
organic and eco-production. The later comprises a few but growing number of farms and 
livestock closely integrated into a modern value chain in national and/or international scale23.   
There have emerged two independent associations of the dairy producers in the country. 
However, they attracted few farms because of the inefficiency in protecting producers’ 
interests with processors and in lobbying for the public support. The sporadic attempts for 
“collective” actions of the milk producers (protests, milk poring in cities, blocking highways 
etc.) have given no positive results. Consequently, there are huge income variation for 
different farms, regions, and years, and a constant reduction in the number of farms. 
A public mode of production quotas for cow milk was introduced in 2007 aiming at 
diminishing the risk from market and income instability. The initial experience shows that 
the individual quotas exceed the nationwide ones and have not been able to eliminate the 
market risks. What is more, the established non-governmental Milk Board have not been able 
to secure the effective organization of producers, reconcile conflicts with the processors and 
lobby for the public support, and its functions have been marked by mismanagement, conflict 
of interests, and corruption. 
In the last years, the strong income decline and protests of producers accompanied with 
increasing public demands for quality and safety in the sector have induced state subsidizing 
(national top-ups) for the dairy producers (Figure 11). The later has not improved the 
deteriorating situation of the sector because of the delays of payments, insufficient scales to 
secure income growth, and predominately benefiting the large(r) producers. 
 
 
Source: MAF 
 
Figure 11. Evolution of income support in Bulgarian farms specialized in Grazing Livestock 
 
Diversification into cheep, goat, and buffalo productions (where no quotas exists) as 
well as into related (processing, restaurant, rural tourism, branding, marketing) and not 
related activity, is also taking a place as a risk reduction strategy of younger entrepreneurs. 
 
The dairy farms experience major risks from the individuals and private agents 
such as: 
                                                
23 A case study for the evolution and the successful market integration of an organic dairy sheep farm 
is presented by Bachev and Tanic. 
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- burglaries and other intrusions on the farm livestock, yields, and property; 
- opportunistic behavior(s) in the contractual relations with the hired labor, 
inputs and service suppliers, buyers of output, and the coalition members in partnership and 
collective organizations; 
- farming or another activity adversely affected the dairy holdings - pollution; 
unwanted “security services” etc. 
There is not an effective public system (police, municipal guards, court) for the 
protection and the recovery of property, and for the punishment of offenders. The farmers are 
extremely vulnerable for thieves and organized crimes since most farm output and property is 
“in open”, dispersed in wide areas and many locations.  
The permanent risk for the agrarian property is widely assured by private modes. Our 
survey has found that the “costs for protection” for all type farms are significant in terms of 
time and resources spent, hired security guards and services, “payments for property 
protection and restoration” etc. Besides, the insurance coverage against burglary is most used 
market assurance of the bigger producers (Figure 9).  
The high transitional uncertainty and insecurity (reputation is not important, difficulties 
to formulate and dispute contracts), the little contractual experience (difficulties to protect 
own interests), the impossibility to write a complete (labor, service supply) contract in 
farming and dispute contractual terms, the high cost for contract enforcement through the 
court system (inefficiency, corruption), all they are responsible for the considerable risk from 
contractual failure24. Not accidentally, most farm managers consider the “respecting laws and 
private contracts” as one of the most important factors for development of dairy farms 
(Figure 12). 
 
                                                
24 Similarly to the market related risk no insurance for the protection from the “contractual risks” 
could be bought on market. 
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         Source: Survey data from Plovdiv region 
 
Figure 12. Most significant factors for development of Bulgarian dairy farms 
 
In order to mitigate the risk from pre- and post-contractual opportunism the private 
modes are broadly employed. Since possibilities for opportunisms are great (high information 
asymmetry, uncertainty, costs for supervision and direction) it is typical to use self-enforced 
own and/or family labor for all critical operations [Bachev, 2010a]. Therefore, the effective 
operation size in most dairy farms is determined by the available household labor. Small 
partnerships are practiced exclusively between relatives and friends where the costs for 
coordination, decision-making and motivation is low (here mutual goals and trust govern 
effectively relations).  
In the large holdings, additional core labor is hired on the permanent basis and the 
output-based compensation, interlinking, social disbursements, supplementary services and 
paid holidays are further used to enhance motivation.  
Similarly, a high-dependency from a particular buyer is effectively governed through 
reciprocal (rather than classical) contracts interlinking inputs, credit, extension etc. supply 
against the milk marketing. 
The large collective (production, inputs supply, marketing, processing) modes are rare 
because of the diversified interests of farmers (different age, unlike size and type of 
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operations, extent of diversification and market orientation); the bad perception associated 
with the “collective” forms (historical legacy, widespread mismanagement, low 
sustainability); the huge transaction costs for initiation and development; and the lack of 
appropriate legislation and incentives for association until recently. 
There are situations where the dairy farms are badly affected by the harmful activities 
of other farms and industries influencing livestock welfare and behavior, causing pollution or 
other damages.  
There are also cases of conflicts of interests over the limited natural resources with 
other agents. Most farmers have no means to defend against such hazards since the 
appropriate legislation is not in place (farmers has no rights) or it is difficult (costly) to 
protect and dispute assigned rights though existing forms (ineffective public enforcement, 
strong “private” pressure). Consequently, the farmers suffer considerable damages (on yields, 
produce quality, animal welfare etc.), perform bellow safety and quality standards, reduce or 
cease livestock activities.        
 
The post communist transition has been associated with the unprecedented changes in 
the institutional structure (social and institutional risks). There has been huge uncertainty 
about the directions and the kind of changes, and instability (dynamics, constant 
amendments, controversies) in the structure of rights, legislation, regulations, taxation, public 
organizations, authorities’ responsibilities, public support mechanisms etc. 
The new public administration has been ineffective, incompetent, unpredictable, and 
corrupted. Carrying out farming and business in such environment has been associated with 
significant risks and costs for studying, complying with, safeguarding from the formal 
regulations and the “informal rules” of the bureaucracy (authority). 
Most livestock operation has been carried by numerous small-scale and primitive 
holdings often located within the residential borders. They contribute significantly to air, 
water and soils pollution, and discomfort of the local population. The conflicts between the 
farms and neighborhoods are common in recent years and bring about strong community 
demand (formal and informal pressure) to limit or relocate activities.  
Carrying livestock activity is risky because of the frictions with the community and 
uncertainty/certainty about the potential need and costs for adaptation. That particular risk 
has been responsible for the low (investment) incentives for modernization in smaller 
(subsistent, semi-market, commercial) holdings. The later additionally contributes to a 
greater exposure to natural, market, and other type institutional risks.  
A considerable risk for the most dairy farms has come from the uncertainty (presently 
“certainty”) surrounding the modes of introduction of EU CAP in the country. Until 
accession there was not clear the pace and scale of implementation of the EU rules in the 
dairy sector of the country. The EU quality, hygiene, veterinary, environment, animal-
welfare etc. standards were introduced in 2007 and there was a transition period for the 
adaptation to the new requirements (until end of 2009). In addition public	 measures have 
been implemented to support adaptation, modernization and market orientation of farms.  
Nevertheless, there were merely 900 farms with 50000 cows meeting the EU raw-milk 
quality	 standards (0.5% of all cow-farms and 13% of cows in the country). At the same time, 
most holdings with milking cows (81%) had no milking installations	 and only 0.1% of the 
dairy farms were with safe manure pile cites [MAF].  
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The public support has been initiated and moved from zero to positive territories 
since 2007 – e.g. currently subsidies accounts for 27% of the net income in farms specialized 
in grazing livestock [MAF]. Nevertheless, the special public measures for the farm 
adaptation, market orientation and modernization has affected a tiny number of the dairy 
holdings (mostly large operators). Consequently, the greatest portion of farms had to move 
into informal sector and perform bellow the official quality and safety standards. 
Our survey of the commercial dairy farms has found out that different type farms 
have unequal capacity for the adaptation to the new EU requirements. Most holdings have no 
sufficient potential for adjustment to the new institutional norms (Table 2). That is 
particularly truth for the small-scale unregistered producers which dominate the sector. Only 
a third of the dairy farms believe their production capacity corresponds to the modern 
requirements of competition, productivity, eco-performance and animal welfare. Merely one-
seventh of the dairy farms have internal capacity and access to outside sources to fund the 
necessary investment associated with the adaptation to the new standards. Thus, most dairy 
farms are effectively at risk to be ceased since do not and can not comply with the legal 
requirements. 
 
Table 2. Share of farms with big and good capacity for adaptation to new EU 
requirements for dairy sector (per cent) 
Type of farms Farms capacity 
Unregistered Firms Coops 
Total 
Extend of knowledge on new requirements 22.7 63.6 100 38.2 
Available skills and knowledge for adaptation 22.7 54.5 100 35.3 
Available production capacity 27.3 45.4  32.3 
Improvement of quality and hygiene standards 36.4 72.7 100 50 
Improving animal welfare 31.8 72.7  44.1 
Improving environmental performance 31.8 54.5  38.2 
Finding necessary investment 9.1 27.3  14.7 
Source: survey data from Plovdiv region 
 
The planed “market orientation” of the huge (semi) subsistence farming has not taken 
place. Programmed funding with the National Plan for Agrarian and Rural Development 
under Measure 141 “Support for Restructuring of Semi-market Holdings” has been greatly 
underutilized (merely 15% of the target reached) because of the lack of interest and 
complicated bureaucratic requirements and procedures.  
It is not feasible to envisage any improvement in the small (semi market and 
commercial) holdings due to the high costs for farm enlargement and adjustment to the new 
market and institutional environment (no entrepreneurial capital available, low investment 
and training capability of aged managers). Besides, most of the farm operators are old in age 
and have no successor willing to undertake the business. Since there is no existing or 
prospective market for a “whole dairy farm” in the country, the incentives for the long-term 
investments for farm modernization are absent.   
Nevertheless, there will be technically and politically impossible to enforce the official 
standards in that enormous informal sector of the economy (especially during the period of 
the economic crisis and the lack of any alternative income opportunities in rural areas). Thus 
there is no significant immediate institutional risk for these farms and they will likely 
dominate the sector in years to come.    
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Modes of governing risks from dairy farms 
 
Major risks to environment from dairy farms are associated with the pollution of 
soils, air and waters; unsustainable use of farmland and grasslands; and significant 
contribution to greenhouse-gas emissions.  
Until recently the voluntary initiatives, private organizations, market driven modes 
(such as organic farming), and public intervention, all have had no significant importance for 
the protection of environment and governing eco-risks from the dairy farming [Bachev, 
2012b]. The cross-compliance eco-requirement and a range of public eco-measures are 
introduced with the EU CAP implementation – eco-conditionality, eco-standards, eco-
regulations, eco-education, financial support to eco-activities, organic farming, zones with 
eco-difficulties, market-orientation and diversification of farms etc.  
As a (side or planed) results from the restructuring of farms and the production 
structures and methods there is considerable amelioration of surface and ground waters 
quality. Nevertheless, Nitrate Vulnerable Zones cover 53% of country’s territory and 68% of 
utilized agricultural lands [MAF]. In drinking water, 5% of the analyses show deviation of N 
up to 5 times above appropriate level, while in water for irrigation in 45% of the samples N 
concentrations exceed contamination limit 2-20 folds [EEA]. The lack of effective manure 
storage capacity and sewer systems, and numerous illegal garbage locations in the rural 
areas, improper use of N fertilizers, crop and livestock practices, non-incompliance with 
rules for farming in water supply zones etc. all are responsible for that problem. What is 
more, decreasing amount of manure has been used for fertilization of merely 0.17% of the 
utilized farmlands in recent years. 
Furthermore, erosion is a major factor for the land degradation as one-third of the 
arable lands are subjected to wind erosion and 70% to water erosion [EEA]. Deforestation, 
uncontrolled pasture, ineffective agro-techniques and crop rotation, plowing pastures, 
deficiency of anti-erosion measures are etc. contribute to that problem. In some regions 
overgrazing of the public (state, municipality) pastures by private and domestic livestock is a 
significant problem while in others the under-grazing poses sustainability problem. 
A negative rate of fertilizer compensation of N, P and K intakes dominate in the 
country being particularly low for P and K [MAF]. In addition unbalance of nutrient 
components has been typical with application of 5.3 times less P and 6.7 times less K with 
appropriate N rate. Consequently, deterioration of agricultural lands comes as a result – the 
share of land affected by acidification increases, and thousands tons of N, P205 and K20 are 
irreversibly removed annually from the soils.  
There is a considerable reduction of GHG emissions from the agriculture since 1989 
[EEA]. Nevertheless, agriculture has been the major ammonia source accounting for two-
thirds of national emission as most NO2 emissions comes from agricultural soils, manure 
management and burning of stubble fields. Similarly, the methane emission from agriculture 
represents about a quarter of the national, and the biggest portion of CH4 comes from the 
fermentation from domestic livestock and manure management.  
Consequently, there is a considerable risk to the nature and the amount and quality of 
the eco-system services related to the development of dairy farming in the country.  
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The livestock farming has been a significant risk to the public which is mostly 
associated with the quality, authenticity, and safety of livestock products; the livestock 
diseases causing considerable treat to human health; the new public, ethical etc. concerns 
about the environment preservation and improvement, animal welfare, keeping tradition etc.  
All that brings to the life appropriate policies, regulations and support measures. 
There has been increasing pressure, control, and sanctions on the dairy farms both by the 
processors and the state for complying with the new requirements (Table 3). Most dairy 
farms had to make or are being undertaking significant changes related to the novel 
institutional requirements in order to sell milk (Figure 13).  
 
Table 3. Control from the processor and the state on farms (% of farms) 
Control on: Processor State body 
Milk quality 94.1 52.9 
Milk safety 47.1 17.6 
Hygiene of production 58.8 44.1 
Animal health 20.6 55.9 
Forage for animals 11.8 35.3 
Care for animals 8.8 35.3 
Care for environment 8.8 41.2 
Control is permanent 2.9 20.6 
Sanctions and punishments are applied 38.2 8.8 
Source: survey data from Plovdiv 
region
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 Source: survey data from Plovdiv region 
 
Figure 13. Changes to be made to sell milk to "Dimitar Madzarov"LTD 
 
Our surveys show that many of the specific EU regulations are not well-known by the 
implementing authorities and a great portion of farmers [Bachev, 2010a]. The lack of 
readiness, experiences and capability would require some time lag until the “full” 
implementation of the CAP in Bulgarian conditions. Besides, most farm managers have no 
adequate training and/or managerial capability, are old in age with small learning and 
adaptation potential. Therefore, there will be significant inequalities in application of the new 
laws and standards in diverse sectors, farms of different type and size, and various regions of 
the country.    
 
The dairy farms pose considerable risks to other farms, individuals, private agents?	 
There are many incidences for using others grasslands and crop yields,	 or otherwise damaging 
land and property by the dairy farmers. Some dairy holdings pose a serious risk for the comport 
of individuals and others businesses (e.g. organic farms, recreation and tourism operators, 
water suppliers etc.). These risks are mitigated privately by the affected individuals and 
businesses through negotiating, monitoring, employing guards, or illegitimate means. 
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The small-scale and semi-subsistence farms have been major milk suppliers to the dairy 
processors putting them in a big (capacity, cite, quality, origin, safety) dependency. Divers 
private modes are broadly used by the processors to deal with those risks.  
We have identified an effective system for the governing risk in relations of “Dimitar 
Madzarov” LTD with more than 1000 small-scale	 milk suppliers from Plovdiv region 
[Bachev, 2011a]. In the last 10 years this dairy-processing company has developed a 
comprehensive system for the protection of interests and the coordination, stimulation, 
controlling, and conflict resolution with the farmers including: building a good reputation and 
trust, constant communications, regular group discussions of problems, training of farmers in 
new industry and institutional requirements, using written delivery contracts, significant 
relation-specific on-farm investments (in milk collecting, cooling, and controlling facilities and 
staff), permanent verification of the quality and the registration of delivered milk by each farm, 
punishment for the offenders, effective and regular payment mode, differential prices 
stimulating farm enlargement and increasing milk-supply, interlinking interest-free crediting 
against the marketing of milk, providing assistance to the farmers in construction and 
preparation public support projects, encouraging farms grouping etc.  
Namely this special governance has contributed considerably for the tighter integration 
with the dairy farms, increasing efficiency of the bilateral relations, enhancing the farms’ 
relation investments, and their adaptation to the company’s requirements for milk quality and 
quantity (Figure 14). Involved farms consider the development of “Dimitar Madzarov”	 LTD 
as one of the most important factors for their own farm development (Figure 13). 
Source:	 Survey data from Plovdiv region	  
 
Figure 14. Main reasons for selling milk to "Dimitar Madzarov"LTD 
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The dairy farming has been responsible for the great risks to markets during 
transition now.  
There was a deficiency in the quantity of different type milks during the market 
adjustments in the first years of the transition. The risks of insufficient supply and the price 
volatility were successfully overcome by the market (rather than failed public25) governance - 
opening up markets, development of market competition and demand. Up-to-date the risk for 
the consumers which is associated with the authentic quality, safety, origin of milk and dairy 
products has been a serious issue and informal (and illegitimate) market is considerable.  
The introduction of the EU standards for milk production and trade is causing a new 
risk for the insufficient supply of local milk. The biggest dairy processors have been trying to 
overcome the shortages of quality local milk through processing imported fresh and/or 
powder milk. Nevertheless, they increasingly face another problem (risk) of the low 
consumer demand for dairy products based on the non-fresh milk.  
In order to deal with that capacity and quality deficiency risk some processors are 
introducing specific modes for the risk governance – origin and quality guarantee, brand 
names, traditional and eco-products etc. The later has brought a variety of private modes for 
the governing vertical relations backwards with the supplying farmers, and upwards with the 
food chains, retailers, and importers [Bachev, 2011a].  
A public intervention is also undertaken aiming at modernizing and commercializing 
the dairy farms, and stimulating the production of dairy, local and eco-products – e.g. 
introduction and protection of rights on dairy products (e.g. special regulations for the 
Bulgarian yogurt and cheese), special traditional and organic products, subsidies for the 
modernization of farms and adaptation to the EU quality and safety standards, support for the 
market orientation, public training and advisory services to farmers etc. 
 
Impact of EU CAP on farms’ risk management capability 
 
The EU integration and the implementation of CAP have affected positively the risk 
management capability of the commercial dairy farming in the country.  
According to the considerable portion of the dairy farms managers the EU CAP 
implementation has had a good or significant impact on the income, efficiency, 
competitiveness and sustainability of their holdings (Figure 14). The positive effect of the 
new policies is especially great for the managerial efficiency of farms which improves their 
ability to govern divers risks in the new conditions. 
Nevertheless, a good proportion of the commercial dairy holdings managers assess as 
neutral or even negative the CAP impacts on different aspects of their farms development. 
The new policies measures affected particularly negatively the competitiveness, the 
economic sustainability, and the managerial efficiency of numerous dairy enterprises. That 
indicates for unchanged or deteriorating capability for risk management (lack of financial 
means, worsen ability to face and adapt to market competition) in some substantial part of the 
dairy farms as a result of the introduction of the EU policies. 
                                                
25 In 1990 there were numerous unsuccessful attempts to stabilize markets by controlling prices, 
banning import or export, introducing quotas and tariffs etc. 
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Source: interviews with farm managers 
Figure 15. Impact of EU CAP implementation on Bulgarian dairy farms 
 
Furthermore, there have been progressive trends in the development of dairy farms 
and their relations with other agents comparing to the period before EU accession (Figure 
15).  
More than a half of the holdings see an increased income, investment, subsidies, 
profitability, and economic sustainability after the EU integration. Two-third of them report 
higher costs, financial independence, and animal-welfare.  Almost 78% of farms experience 
superior qualification and information, and bigger integration with the suppliers. All that is 
likely associated with decreased risks and improved risk management in the majority of 
commercial dairy holdings. 
 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
Figure 16. Importance of dairy farms’ indicators comparing to the period before EU accession 
(percent of farms) 
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At the same time, more than 22% of dairy farms reports lower than before 
profitability and memberships in professional organization, and higher dependency from the 
buyers and processors. Every 11 out of 100 farms has got a poorer income, investment, 
managerial and contractual efficiency, competitiveness, innovation introduction, and 
economic sustainability, and a higher indebtedness and dependency from the suppliers 
comparing to the period before EU integration.  
Therefore, a good portion of the dairy farms in the country have not improved or 
wakened their capability for risk management during the EU integration and CAP 
implementation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the modes, efficiency and challenges of risk management in agri-food 
chain let us withdraw a number of academic, business and policies recommendations: 
First, the governance (along with the technical, information etc.) issues are to take a 
central part in the risk management analysis and design. The type of threats and risks, and the 
specific (natural, technological, behavioral, dimensional, institutional etc.) factors, and 
comparative benefits and costs (including third-party, transaction, time) are to be taken into 
account in assessing the efficiencies, complementarities and the prospects of alternative 
(market, private, public and hybrid) modes. The system of the risk management is to 
adapt/improved taking advantage of the number of the new opportunities and 
overcoming/defending against the evolving new challenges summarized in the paper. 
Second, more hybrid (public-private, public-collective) modes should be employed 
given the coordination, incentives, control, and costs advantages. The (pure) public 
management of the most agri-food-chain risks is difficult or impossible (agents opportunism, 
informal sector, externalities). Often the introduction and enforcement of new rights (on food 
security, risk-management responsibility etc.), and supporting the private and collective 
initiatives (informing, training, assisting, funding) is much more efficient. 
Third, a greater (public) support must be given to multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary research on (factors, modes, impacts of) the risk governance in the agri-food 
chain in order to assist effectively the national and international policies, the design of modes 
for public interventions, and the individual, collective and business actions for the risk 
management. 
The analysis of the post-communist development of dairy farming has identified quite 
specific risk structures facing by and causing from this sector of Bulgarian agriculture. The 
huge market and institutional instability and uncertainty, and the high transaction costs, have 
blocked the evolution of effective market and collective modes for the risk protection. A 
great variety of private modes (internal organization, vertical integration, interlinking etc.) 
have emerged to deal with the significant natural, market, private, and institutional risks 
faced by the dairy farms and affected agents.  
Diverse risks associated with the Bulgarian dairy farming were not effectively 
governed and persist during the transition now. That was a consequence of the ineffective 
public (Government, international assistance etc.) intervention to correct market and private 
sector failures in the risk governance. The later have had considerable negative impacts on 
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the evolution of (size, productivity, sustainability of) the farms, the development of the 
markets, the structure of production and consumption, and the state of environment.  
The EU integration and CAP implementation improved significantly the risk 
management capability of a great portion of commercial dairy holdings. At the same time, a 
good portion of the dairy farms have not improved or even wakened their capability for risk 
management in the new economic and institutional environment. Furthermore, certain risks 
related to the dairy sector “disappeared” due to the ineffective risk governance and declining 
dairy farming. That would lead to a further deformation in the development of dairy and 
related sectors unless effective public (regulations, assistance, control etc.) measures are 
taken to mitigate the existing problems and risks. 
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